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On the Aggregation  of Money  Measures  of
Well-Being  in Applied Welfare  Economics
David Donaldson
This article investigates the properties, good and bad, of social evaluations based on four
money measures of well-being or changes in well-being: compensating variations, money
metrics,  extended  money  metrics,  and  welfare  ratios.  Consistency  of social  rankings
(transitivity,  asymmetry of preference), the possibility of incorporating  inequality aver-
sion, independence  of the choice of reference prices, and the ethics implicit in the eval-
uations are considered.  In addition,  these procedures  are contrasted with utility aggre-
gation using equivalence  scales.
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Cost-benefit analysis  and other applications of welfare economics employ money measures of well-being
or changes in well-being and evaluate economic states of affairs with aggregates of  these measures-usually
simple sums. The most favored measure is the compensating variation or willingness to pay. It is an index
of welfare change  for a household or individual. The equivalent variation (another Hicksian consumer's
surplus)  "measures"  welfare change as well. The Marshallian consumer's surplus, with all its difficulties,
is still used,  usually as an approximation to the compensating  variation (Willig).  Other money measures
of the level of well-being are money metric utilities -in  both standard and extended forms-and welfare
ratios. Compensating and equivalent variations and ordinary money metrics are determined by preferences
alone,  while extended money metrics and welfare ratios require  interpersonal comparisons of utilities.
This article surveys the literature  on the properties,  good and bad, of these measures,  using as criteria
various aspects  of their performance  in performing  social evaluations. In addition, their performance  is
contrasted  with the  use  of aggregate  of utilities-direct  indexes  of well-being-implemented  with  an
equivalence-scale  methodology.
Performance in social evaluation is viewed from several standpoints. First, rationality properties (tran-
sitivity, asymmetry of preference)  of social binary relations based on the various measures are discussed.
Second,  given that states  of affairs  are  ordered  consistently, the  possibility  of incorporating  inequality
aversion is examined.  Because concavity or nonconcavity  of the utility functions  that money measures
represent  has consequences  for inequality  aversion,  concavity is the third area of investigation.  Fourth,
when indexes depend  on a reference  price or quantity vector  or a reference household type-as money
metrics and extended money metrics do-conditions for independence of the social ordering of this choice
are investigated. Fifth, the ethics implicit in the evaluations produced with these aggregates are examined.
The possibility  of incorporating inequality aversion is included because  procedures that are  restricted
to zero inequality aversion are of limited usefulness in societies whose prevailing ethical judgments include
a concern (even a small one) for distributive justice. Further, ethically  flexible evaluation procedures  can
themselves contribute to a sensible discussion of the idea of distributional equity and the incentive trade-
off.
The setting for these  exercises is a general equilibrium  one, with marketed private goods and unpriced
public or semipublic  goods.  Two domains  for prices and unpriced goods  are  employed:  the first allows
prices and the consumption of unpriced goods to differ among households, and the second requires them
to be the same for all.
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Money  measures  that  do  not require  interpersonal  comparisons-consumers'  surpluses  and  money
metrics-are discussed first.  Then extended money metrics and welfare ratios-that require interpersonal
comparisons-are  considered, and,  finally, these procedures  are contrasted with utility aggregation  using
equivalence  scales.
No  methodology  in applied  welfare  economics  is  perfect.  Practical  work is  always  limited  by  the
availability  of data  and  the problem  of estimating  the  economic  consequences  of projects.  Different
evaluation procedures  are,  therefore,  bound to be differentially  useful in different situations. One of the
aims of this essay is to  acquaint readers of this journal with the theoretical  strengths and weaknesses  of
the various procedures  in the hope that their ability to make good practical  choices will be enhanced.
Aggregation  without Interpersonal Comparisons
Compensating  Variations
A single household or individual's compensating variation or willingness to pay for an economic change
is the maximum amount the household would be willing to pay to secure the change.  This definition can
be extended to cover changes that make the household worse off, according to its preferences, and copes
well with price and income changes,  public or semipublic  goods,  externalities, and work and leisure.
If the household  consumes private goods only and faces positive prices p = (pi, ... , Pm) with income
(consumption expenditure) y, the compensating variation, c, for the change from (pb, yb)  (b is for "before")
to  (pa, ya)  (a is for "after") is given by
(1)  V(pa, ya - C)=  V(pb  yb)= ub,
where  V is the household's  indirect utility function, and ub and  ua its (ordinal) utility levels before and
after the change.  Because
(2)  V(p,  y) = u - y = E(u, p),
where E is the expenditure function corresponding  to  V [E(u, p) is the minimum expenditure  needed to
reach the indifference  surface indexed by u at prices p],  equation (1) may be solved for c, and
(3)  c = ya  - E(u,  pa) = E(ua, pa) -E(ub,  pa).
Equation (3) shows that  c is an  exact measure  of welfare  change  for the household:  positive  when  the
change makes the household better off,  and negative when the household is made worse off. Equation  (3)
can be rewritten as
(4)  c =  (ya  - yb)  + (E(ub  pb)  E(ub, pa)).
Equation (4) makes it clear that if prices do not change, the compensating variation is just equal to income
change.  If a particular project is to be evaluated, then its costs may be assigned to particular households.
These costs correspond to the term (ya  - yb) in equation (4). If the simple sum of compensating variations
is used,  the aggregate  project  cost may be  subtracted  from the aggregate  surplus which  considers  only
other effects of the project.
Economic  states  of affairs  can be  ranked by  summing  compensating  variations  across (at least  two)
households.  Staying within the private-good framework for the moment, and allowing prices to vary across
households  (because of regional price variations and differing wage  rates), an economic change moves the
economy from B = (7r b, y)  to A  =  (7ra, ya), where  r = (pl, ... , ph, ...  , pH) is the vector of prices facing
the H  households (ph is an m-vector,  m >  2), and  Y = (y1,... , Y  ... , Yn)  is the vector of their incomes.
Two price domains are considered. The first allows prices to be household-specific,  and it is called Price
Domain I (PDI):
(5)  PDI = {r = (pl,...,  pH) ph E E+  for all hE {1,..., H}}.
Price Domain II (PD,,) restricts the domain by requiring prices to be the same for all households:
(6)  PDII =  {Er E PDiIph = pk  for all h, k E {1,  ... , H}}.
A social binary relation, R-meaning "is at least as good as"-may be defined using the compensating
variations (cl,  ...  ,  c h ..  cH), with
H
(7)  ARB  Ch  O0,
h=l
a strict inequality for strict preference  (P), and an equality  for indifference  (I).
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This rule is the one  most commonly  used in  cost-benefit analysis  and  applied  welfare economics.  In
the former,  costs are  opportunity  costs-reductions  in total income  caused by  diversion of productive
resources-and producers' surpluses are changes in incomes due to changes in profit. The rule is consistent
with the Pareto principle, but does not satisfy Arrow's independence  axiom  of irrelevant alternatives.1
R is not always a complete,  reflexive, and transitive ordering,2 and strict preference may be symmetric,
allowing both APB and BPA.3 In Price Domain I (PD,), there is no profile of preferences  that results in a
social  ordering.  In PDn, however,  with all households facing the same prices,  a necessary and  sufficient
condition  on household  preferences  for R to  be an ordering  (Roberts)  is the existence of an "aggregate
consumer"  (Gorman) with indirect utility functions
(8)  VP(,  Yh)  =  Y(P)yh  +  h(p),
h = 1, ... ,  H. Each household's  preferences  must be quasihomothetic  (straight line Engel curves)  and,
for each price vector,  all households'  Engel curves must be parallel,  a condition  that is not met by real
households.
In addition,  Boadway showed that the compensating variation test is not the same as the compensation
test.4 For example,  moves with lump-sum transfers  between different  Pareto-efficient  states in a private
goods economy typically result in a positive sum of compensating variations. This invalidates the standard
efficiency  argument  for the compensating-variation  test because no  efficiency gain has  occurred.
A more general  test for project evaluation is given by
(9)  ARB  - F(c,,...,H)  >  O,
with a strict inequality for social preference.  R is Pareto-inclusive if and only if F is increasing in each of
its arguments.  F could be chosen to exhibit inequality aversion,  for example,  with higher weights on the
compensating variations of low-income households.
It has been shown, however (Blackorby and Donaldson  1985), that in PDi,  there is no choice for F  and
no profile of household preferences that results in an R that is an ordering.  On the restricted price domain
PDi, R is an ordering if and only if there is an aggregate consumer and Fis a weighted sum of the household
surpluses, with
H
(10)  F(cl, ... ,  CH)  =  ahCh,
h=i
ah >  0,  h =  1, ... , H, or any increasing  transform.  The weights must be attached to household  names
rather than,  say, position in the income distribution. The reason for this is that compensating variations
measure welfare  change  rather than levels-there  is no way to  distinguish between  increases in income
from  $10,000 to $11,000  and from $110,000  to $111,000..
It may be possible to justify the use of distributional weights,  however. If households  can be  assigned
to income groups such as quintiles and if projects produce little or no changes in group membership, then
weights may reflect income-group membership. Further, weights may be assigned using a single-parameter
social-welfare  function such as the S-Gini (Donaldson and Weymark).  Unfortunately,  an aggregate  con-
sumer is still required for consistency.
Turning to the ethical  properties of tests based on  compensating  variations,  if prices  do not change,
compensating  variations are equal to income  differences  [equation (3)],  and,  when the sum is used,
(11)  ARB  2y  :  yh.
h  h
This  commits investigators  to  be indifferent  to  changes  in the distribution  of income, whatever  prices
might be. It is possible to ask whether this can be consistent with a Pareto-inclusive Bergson-Samuelson
social  welfare  function,  WD.  If it  is, then  the  indirect  Bergson-Samuelson  function,  W.,  can be  writ-
ten as
(12)  W(7r,  Y)  =  WD(VI(pl,  l)...,  V(pH,  YH))  =  Wrl7,  Yh)-
h
This is a special  case of a "price  independent  welfare  prescription"  (Roberts). Equation  (12)  cannot be
satisfied on PDI, and on PDn, equation (12) can be true if and only if there is an aggregate consumer.  In
the more general  case,  with R  given by equation  (9), consistency with a Pareto-inclusive  social welfare
function is impossible on PD, and requires equation (10) and an aggregate consumer on PDII (Blackorby
and Donaldson  1985).
This result  contains an important truth:  that indifference  to the distribution of income is inconsistent
with  every  Pareto-inclusive  social welfare  function  and,  therefore,  with the  Paretian  value judgment.5
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This  inconsistency  is  true in the  same-price  case  (PD,,) as  well  as  the more  general  case  because  real
household behavior  is not consistent  with the aggregate-consumer  condition.  This  result highlights  the
most important weakness of the compensating variation  methodology as well: It cannot  take account  of
the  social concern for economic inequality.
Compensating variation tests are often used in situations where some goods-such as parks, highways,
and other public and semipublic goods-are unpriced.  If a single household's consumption of these goods
is the vector z, then the compensating variation for a project which moves the household from (pb, yb, zb)
to (pa, y",  Za)  is
(13)  c =  (ya - yb)  + [E(ub  pb,  zb)  - E(ub,  pa, Za)],
where E is the conditional expenditure function corresponding  to the direct utility function  U(x, z) (where
x is the  household's consumption  of private  goods).
Writing Z = (z1, ... , ZH),  a project which moves the economy from B =  (0rb,  b,  Zb) to A  = (ra, Ya,  Za)
may be tested with the sum of compensating variations [equation (7)]  or a more general function of them
[equation  (9)]. Again, the resulting  social ranking is never an ordering of the alternatives when PD 1 is the
price domain. In PDn 1, consistency  requires household preferences  to  satisfy
(14)  Vh(p, Yh,  Zh)  = Y(p)Yh  +  h(p,  Zh)
if consumption of the unpriced goods  can be different across households, and
(15)  Vh(p,  Yh,  z)  =  T(p, Z)yh  + [h(p, Z)
if consumption  is the same  for all-the  pure  public goods  case.6 Equation  (14)  is extremely  restrictive,
implying that consumption ofz is independent of income.  In addition, because the less restrictive equation
(15) implies an aggregate consumer for every value of z, it cannot describe real preferences.
A word about equivalent variations is in order.  It is true that the equivalent variation performs better
than the compensating variation for a single consumer. If the equivalent variation for one project is greater
than the equivalent variation for another, the end state of the first project is preferred  to the end state of
the second, a property that is not shared by the compensating variation (Hause;  Pauwels). This property
is independent  of the equivalent variation's aggregation  consistency,  however.  All  the above results for
the compensating variation carry  over (Blackorby  and Donaldson  1985).
So far,  the questions of aggregation  consistency  of compensating variations  in intertemporal  and un-
certain  economic  environments  have  been ignored,  in  the belief that the  case  against  their  use in the
certainty case is strong enough. There are, however,  some difficulties in the single-consumer case in these
environments  that parallel  the many-person  certainty case. For example, given perfect capital markets,
the discounted  sum of consumers' surpluses cannot provide  an exact index of welfare  change (Blackorby,
Donaldson,  and Moloney).
The Marshallian  consumer's surplus has been excluded from this discussion for two reasons.  The first
is its well-known problem of  path-dependence  (Silberberg), and the second is that the standard justification
for its use is that it can approximate the compensating variation  (Willig). In addition,  because aggregate
demand curves  are used in most cases for the calculation of these surpluses, consistency requires that the
necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for the  existence  of an aggregate  demand  curve-an aggregate  con-
sumer-must be satisfied.
Money Metric Utility
Money metric utility (or, simply, the money metric) for a given commodity vector is the minimum income
needed at fixed reference prices to pay for a commodity bundle that is at least as good as the one actually
consumed.7 In the private  goods case, it is defined by
(16)  m = MD(x, pr)  = E(U(x),  pr),
where MD stands  for the direct money metric, x is the commodity bundle consumed,  pr is the vector of
reference prices,  and U is the direct utility function.  MD is invariant to increasing transforms of U (since
E is transformed in an "opposite"  way).  Because E is increasing  in u, the money metric is a particular
normalization of the utility function. 8 In contrast to the compensating variation, it provides an index of
the utility level of the members  of the household.  No attention is paid to household  composition.  The
indirect money metric utility function, M,, is the indirect corresponding  to MD,  and can be written  as
(17)  m  =  M,(p, y, pr)  =  E(V(p, y), pr).
Money metrics can be aggregated to evaluate the economic states B =  (7rb,  yb) and A  = (Ta,  Ya)  discussed
above.  Costs  of a particular  project are  included  in the vector  Y".  A function  (G) like a  social welfare
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function is used and
(18)  ARB  - G(m?  ... ,  m~) >  G(m\, ... , mr),
where mh  and mh are household h's money metric values before  and after the project.  The simple  sum
of money metrics is a special  case, with
H  H
(19)  ARB  - mh  - mb.
h=l  h=l
Reference  prices and actual prices are assumed to be in the same price domain (PD, or PD,,).
R  in  equation  (18)  or  equation  (19)  is  always  an  ordering.  There  are  never problems  of preference
reversals,  even with household-specific  prices.  Further, the function  G may exhibit inequality aversion,
and different degrees  of inequality aversion can be incorporated by employing a single-parameter family
of functions such as the S-Ginis.  This is a great improvement  over the compensating-variation  test. The
ordering R,  in general,  does depend on  rr,  of course, and lrr must be fixed  once and for all, independently
of  rb and Tra.  Rules based on money  metrics do not satisfy independence  of irrelevant alternatives. 9
But money metric utilities are not without difficulties.  In order for rules such as those in equations (18)
and (19) to be consistent with usual distributional judgments,  direct money  metrics must be concave in
x and,  equivalently  (Diewert  1980),  indirect  money  metrics  must  be concave  in y for  all p.  Without
concavity, the rules in equations  (18) and (19) may recommend that a fixed aggregate bundle of goods or
a fixed total income should be given entirely to one person, even when G in equation (18) is quasiconcave.
Quasihomothetic and, therefore,  homothetic preferences have concave money metrics.  If
(20)  V(p,  y) = '(p)y  + P(p),
the expenditure function is
u  - A(P)
(21)  E(u, p) =
r(P)
and the money metric is
y0(p)y  _+ 3(p)  - (pr)
(22)  M,(p, y, pr)  pr
,(v r)
which is affine  and, therefore,  concave in y for all p and for all pr.  The indirect money metric is concave
in y for all p-or, equivalently,  the direct  money metric  is concave in x-for all reference  prices,  pr, if
and only if each household's  preferences  are quasihomothetic' 0 (Blackorby and Donaldson  1988). These
preferences  may be different for each household,  so that an aggregate  consumer is not required.  There
are,  however,  well-behaved  utility functions  with  concave  representations  whose  money  metrics  are
nonconcave for all choices of  pr  (see Blackorby and Donaldson 1988, p.  125). Concavity of money metrics
is, therefore, a strong restriction-one  that does not correspond to real household preferences.
If the aggregator  function G in equation (18)  [the simple sum in equation (19)] is chosen independently
of reference  prices,  rr (pr when prices are the same for all), then the social ordering, R, depends on  rr. It
is possible,  of course, to choose  a different  aggregator for each lrr so that R is the same for all pr, but in
practice this is not done. Suppose that, in a two-household society with the same prices for both households
but different preferences,
(23)  u,  =  Vl(p,  Y)  =  -
Pi
and
(24)  u2 =  V2(p,  Y2)  = Y2.
P2
Then,  indirect money metrics are
(25)  M,(p, y, pr)= pp  )  p  U,
and
(26)  M,(p, y, pr) = p()  = pu 2. (26)  r2  2,U2~~~~~~\p
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If the sum is used  for social evaluation, the "social welfare  function"  is
(27)  p1ul + pru2,
the weighted sum of utilities with the weights equal to reference prices! Since it is unlikely that investigators
intend to adopt  such arbitrary  and capricious ethics, it is useful to find the conditions under which  the
social ordering,  R, in equations  (18) or (19)  is independent  of the choice of 7r
r.
The general condition, whether prices are allowed to be household-specific or not, is that R is independent
of  71r if and only if it is consistent with a Pareto-inclusive  social welfare function,  WD, which in turn must,
along with household  preferences,  be a price-independent  welfare prescription (Roberts). That is,
(28)  BRA  WD,(u, ... , u,) >  WD(u,  ... ,  ub),
where
(29)  WD(u,...,  UH)  = WD(V(p', y,),...,  V/H(p,  y,)) =  W,(r, G(y,,  .,  ))
A proof of this result is provided in the appendix (theorem 1). It was discovered independently by Laisney
and Schmachtenberg.
In the case that prices are the same for all households, equation (28) holds on the smaller price domain
PD,.  Note that the function  G is the same  as G in equation (18) so that an aggregate  consumer [equation
(8)] must exist when the sum of money metrics is employed.
Slivinski has shown that equation (29) holds on the larger domain of household-specific prices, PD 1, if
and only if: (a) households have preferences  satisfying
(30)  Vh(ph,  h)  =  y(ph)ln(yh)  +  )h(ph).
h  =  1,  ... ,  H  (y is common to  all) or any increasing  transform;  and (b) the aggregator function,  G,  is
Cobb-Douglas,  with
(31)  G(ml, ... ,  m)  = mV
1 ...  ma,
where  6h  >  0 for all h. If preferences are required to be globally regular,  then - in equation (30) must be
independent  of p (Blackorby and Donaldson  1989), and preferences  must therefore  be homothetic (but
can  differ  among  households).  This  result  has  the immediate  consequence  that, if the sum  of money
metrics is employed,  and if prices can be household-specific, R cannot be independent of the choice of err.
If the price domain is PD,, so that  prices cannot  be household-specific,  R in equation (19)  (when the
sum of money metrics is used) is independent  of pr if and only if an aggregate  consumer exists  [equation
(8)]. If G is additively separable,  then it is ordinally equivalent to
(32)  G(m,, ... ,  m)  =  O  kh(mA),
h
and, in this case,  satisfaction of equation (29) requires
(33)  kh(mh)  = ahmh,
where a  0, or
(34)  Oh(mh)  = ahln(mh),
with
(35)  Fh(p, Yh)  =- Y()Y
q+ 
- h(p)
or any  increasing transform of equation (35),  or
(36)  Vh(p,  Yh)  =  y(p)ln(Yh)  + fh(p)
or any increasing transform (Roberts). This restriction is weaker than the aggregate-consumer requirement,
but it is worth noting that the form of individual utility functions embodies  the ethics of G.
In the  case of unpriced goods, these results are easily extended.  If a single household consumes (x, z),
where x is a vector of private goods and z is a vector of unpriced goods,  the direct and indirect money
metrics are
(37)  m  =  E(U(x, z),  pr  zr)
and
Donaldson
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where  U is the directed  utility function,  V is the conditional  indirect, E is the conditional  expenditure
function, and zr is a reference vector of unpriced goods.
Social states are ranked with equation (18) or equation (19),  but, in general, the social ordering depends
on the choices of reference  prices and reference unpriced goods.  Two domains for Z and Zr are possible:
ZDi is the case in which both z and zr can vary across households;  and ZD,, makes z and zr the same for
each household.
Four theorems are possible,  but only two are considered-on the domains PDi/ZDi  and PD,,/ZD,,. On
both domains, R, defined by equation (18),  is independent  of reference prices and quantities  if and only
if:  (a) it is  consistent  with  a  Pareto-inclusive  social  welfare  function,  W;  and  (b)  W  and  household
preferences  provide a price-independent  welfare prescription, with
(39)  W,(u, .. .,  U  =)  =  WD(V(p
', y,  z'),...  VH(pH,  , ZH)
=  W,(r,  G(y,  ...  , YH),  Z),
where Z = (z', ...  ,  H). On the unrestricted  domain PD,/ZD,, the conditional  indirects must satisfy
(40)  /(ph,  yh,  zh)  =  y(ph,  zh)ln(Yh)  + 0h(ph,  Zh),
h = 1, ... , H, and G must be Cobb-Douglas  [equation (31)].
On the restricted  domain PDII/ZDnI,  additive separability of G [equation (32)]  and independence  of R
from reference  prices  and quantities hold if and only if equations  (33) and (34)  are satisfied,  and
(41)  (p  yh,  Z)  =  y(p,  Z)h  +  h(p, Z)
or
(42)  (p, Yh,  z)  =  y(p,  z)ln(Yh)  +  h(P,  Z)
for all h.
These  results  suggest that although  money metric  utilities are  an improvement  over consumers'  sur-
pluses, they are  still seriously deficient as  measures of well-being  for social evaluation.
Aggregation  with Interpersonal Comparisons
Compensating  variations  and money  metric utilities are  based on  preferences  alone. If two households
with different numbers  of people have  the same preferences and experience  the same change  in income
and prices,  the compensating  variation and money metrics  are identical.
Measures  of  well-being that require interpersonal comparisons of well-being between people in different
households attempt to account for differences in needs of different types of  people (adults, children, disabled
people)  and to take account of economies  of scale in consumption.
In this section, households are described by vectors of characteristics such as age, sex, and special needs
of household  members.  a, describes  household  h,  nh  is the number of people in household  h,  and n =
nh  is the number of people in the economy.
h
The utility of each member of a household  with characteristics  a is
(43)  u =  U(x, a)
when household consumption of marketed private goods is x.  Because the names of household members
may appear, in principle,  in a, equation (43) is a generalization of the usual model. In practice, however,
households are grouped by a smaller set of  possible characteristics, and equation (43) represents a significant
restriction  (see Blackorby and Donaldson 1989, 1991  for a discussion). This model ignores intrahousehold
inequality.
The indirect and expenditure functions associated with U are  Vand E, where u =  V(p,  y, a) is the utility
level of a household with characteristics  a and household income  y facing prices p,  and E(u, p, a) is the
minimum expenditure needed  at prices p to bring each member  of a household with characteristics a to
utility level u.
It is assumed that levels of well-being (utility) are comparable interpersonally.  That is, statements like
(44)  U(x, a) = U(x,  &),
or  similar  statements  with  inequalities  are  assumed to  be meaningful  when  a&  =  &. Utilities  may be
ordinally measurable as long as increasing transforms of Uare not a-specific. Other measurability properties
are possible (see Blackorby and Donaldson  1991  for a discussion).
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This  model  permits social evaluations  in which  each person  in the  economy  counts. Using  a social
welfare  function defined on all  n people, states are compared using
(45)  W(Ul,  ... ,  ,;  u2, ... ,;  .... ;  Uh,...,Uh),
nl  n2  nh
where  Uh is the utility level of each person in household  h.
The  inclusion of unpriced  goods (Z) in the model  is  straightforward and  results in the direct  utility
function  U(x, z, a), conditional indirect  V(p, y, z, a), and conditional  expenditure function E(p, y,  z, a).
Extended Money Metrics
Extended money  metrics  or equivalent  incomes  (King)  are  defined  using  a reference  household with
characteristics a  r. This is usually chosen to be a single-adult household.
The extended money metric is the minimum expenditure a reference individual must have at reference
prices to achieve  the level  of utility that  each  member of the  household in question  has. The  direct
extended metric in the private goods case  is
(46)  m = MD (X,  a,  pr  ar) = E(U(x, a), pr  ar),
and the indirect is
(47)  m =  M  (p, y,  a, pr, ar) = E(V(p, y,  a), pr  ar).
Following King,  the same  reference  prices  are used for every household.  The  indirect money metric is
sometimes called equivalent income  (ye)  because it solves the equation
(48)  V(r, Ye,  ar) =  V(p,  y, a)."
The extended money  metrics need interpersonal  comparisons because  ar and a are different in equation
(48).
Extended money  metrics  extend  the advantages  of money  metrics  by  allowing  investigators  to  take
account  of the well-being  of each  person  in  the economy  [as in  equation  (45)],  economies  of scale  in
household consumption,  and differential household needs.
They inherit  the problems  of ordinary  money  metrics,  however.  They  are  not,  in general,  concave
(because the extended money  metric for the reference  household is its ordinary  money metric),  and the
social  ordering R  [determined  by equation  (18)  or equation (19)]  is not,  in general,  independent  of pr.
Further,  the ordering R is not normally independent  of the choice  of a reference  household.
Suppose,  for example,  that there  are  two single-person  household types  facing the same  prices,  with
utility functions
/  \1/2  /  \1/3
(49)  V(p,  ya,)  = (  , V(  , a2)  =  (
Choosing ar = a, yields extended money metrics
(50)  M,(p,  ;,, a,, p  a,) = pi  )  M,  , ap  ,  y2  ,  a  a,) = pi2
Choosing ar = a2 yields
(51)  MP,  y, , a,  pr, a2) = P2  )  (  ,  MAp,  Y2,  a2, p,  a2) = P2
Household l's money metric with a' = ea2is not concave in y for any p, pr. This nonconcavity occurs even
though both households have concave,  homothetic utility functions. Aggregation  in the two cases clearly
results in different social  orderings.
The conditions for independence  of the social  ordering of reference prices pr is less restrictive  than in
the ordinary money metric case (the above example is independent ofpr when the sum is used). Conditions
can be found for the additively separable  case, however (see theorems  2 and  3 in the appendix).  In that
situation, independence requires reference preferences  only to  satisfy equation  (35)  or equation (36) with
corresponding  functional  forms for the aggregator.
In the case of unpriced goods, the extended money  metrics are
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(52)  m  =  MD(x,  z, a, pr  zrs  Or)  =  E(U(x,  z  a), pr,  zr  ar)
and
(53)  m = M,(p, y,  z, a, pr  zr,  ar) = E(V(p, y,  , a), pr  zr ar).
Independence  of R from  (pr,  zr) requires reference preferences  to satisfy equation (41)  or equation (42).
Where  do the interpersonal  comparisons  needed for extended money metrics come from? 1 2 They can
be provided formally by choosing a particular utility function for each possible a, but this requires a set
of judgments  that are  separate from  knowledge of preferences.  One possibility is to choose consumption
vectors for every utility level and household  type such that utilities are believed to be equal. That is, for
utility level u and characteristics a, X(u,  a) makes
(54)  U(X(u, a), a) = u,
for all a and u. This provides a way  to choose an appropriate  normalization of U and, therefore,  V and
E  (or  V and E).
Welfare Ratios
The welfare  ratio for a household with characteristics  a is the ratio of household income to the minimum
expenditure  needed for a reference  level of utility ur, or, in the private goods case,
(55)  T(p, y,  a, a') =
g(u
r, p,  a)'
If ur is the poverty level of  utility, E(ur, p, a)  is the poverty line at pricesp for a household with characteristics
a. The welfare  ratio is measured  in "poverty lines" and is an index of the well-being  of each household
member.'3 Welfare ratios can be aggregated  to make social evaluations with a social welfare function [see
equation  (45)].
The welfare  ratio is an index of well-being that is not exact-the function  T(.,  U,  r ,  ') is not ordinally
equivalent to  V unless full homotheticity  is satisfied.  Full homotheticity requires that for all x, x, &,  and
a,
(56)  U(,  &) =  U(x, a)  U(x,  ) =  U(Xk, &)
for all X >  0.  For a = &,  equation  (56)  implies that individual  preferences  are homothetic  and, when &
# a, equation (56) requires that a common  scaling of consumption bundles preserves utility equality.  In
this special case,  welfare  ratios are  proportional to extended money metrics.
Since full homotheticity  is not normally satisfied, welfare  ratios must be regarded  as inexact indexes of
well-being:  approximations based on homothetic preferences  which,  in turn, are  based on reference in-
difference  surfaces.
Although they are  inexact,  welfare ratios  have  some attractive  properties:  first,  they take  account  of
family  size and economies of scale through E(u r p, a); second,  they are always concave (T is linear in y
for all p, a,  ur); third, they are sensitive to (possibly household-specific) price changes through E(ur  ., a);
and fourth, they economize on interpersonal comparisons-all that is needed is normalization of U at the
reference level of utility. The requisite interhousehold normalization can be done by finding consumption
vectors X(ur, a), one for each household type, such that equation (54) is satisfied with u = ur only. These
commodity bundles could be provided by poverty researchers.
When preferences are  homothetic and, as a consequence,  welfare ratios are  exact, the social ordering
is independent  of ur if and only if W in equation  (45)  is homothetic  (Blackorby and Donaldson  1987).
For that reason,  a homothetic social welfare function  is a reasonable choice.
Welfare ratios can be extended to include unpriced goods, with
(57)  T(p, y, z, a,  ur)  -=  (ur p  z,
If ur is the poverty utility, then the denominator is the poverty line, and it depends on z as well as p.
Although welfare ratios are a little rough, they are fairly easily calculated, and their linearity in income
permits a clear interpretation of the distributional judgments in social evaluations. Given the inadequacy
of available data in so many applications of welfare economics, they might prove attractive.
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Utility Aggregation  Using  Equivalence  Scales
None  of the  money measures  of well-being  described  above  are  very  satisfactory.  Compensating  (and
equivalent) variations are the worst of  all, but, although money metrics and welfare ratios have advantages,
they retain  some real problems. Of course, some simplification  of reality is inevitable in applications  of
welfare  economics, but it is important to have a methodology that can deal with the essential elements-
price change,  preference diversity, differences in household types, and flexible ethics.
Equivalence scales may be able to provide a useful methodology for making interpersonal comparisons
and can be used to estimate poverty  lines, compute the denominators  of welfare ratios,  and provide  a
methodology for utility-based welfare analysis. Equivalence  scales  are either commodity-independent  or
commodity-specific.'4 The discussion here is confined  to the commodity-independent  case.
In a  private-goods  economy,  the number  of adult equivalents  in a household with  characteristics  a
facing prices p with income y is d, where
(58)  u =  V(p, y,  a) =  V(p,  ,d
If y is $60,000  and d = 3 for a family of four, then the household is equivalent, in terms of well-being,
to four reference  single adults with $20,000  each. The magnitude of d reflects both economies  of scale in
consumption and special needs.
Equation (58)  can be solved for d, with
E(u, p,  a)
(59)  d = D(u, p, a)  E(u  p, a)
where d is the ratio of the cost to the household of the actual utility level to the cost for a reference person.
Because u in equation (59) is normally unobservable, empirical tractability demands that D be independent
of u. It is independent of u if and only if a condition called equivalence-scale exactness (ESE) is satisfied,
in which case E is multiplicatively separable into a function of u andp, and a function ofp and a (Blackorby
and Donaldson 1989,  1991; Lewbel 1988a, b). Given ESE, the utility-independent  equivalence scale A is
E'(u, p)E
2(p,  a)  E
2(p,  a)
(60)  d =  A(p  a) = El(u  p)E
2(p, a)  E
2(p, ar)
In addition, E can be written as
(61)  E(u, p, a) = Er(u, p)A(p,  a),
where Er is the reference person's expenditure  function E(.,  , a r).
Equivalence-scale exactness is equivalent to a condition on the indirect utility function Vcalled income-
ratio comparability  (IRC) (Blackorby and Donaldson  1989,  1991). It requires that if any household and
the  reference  household  experience  utility  equality  at  the  same  prices,  then  common  income  scaling
preserves that equality.  Formally, IRC requires (for all a, p, y, and 9) that
(62)  V(p,  9, a) =  V(p,  , ar) ~  V(p,  X,  a)  =  V(p,  X,  atr),
for all X > 0. IRC is weaker  than full homotheticity.
IRC can  be used as an axiom  to justify  ESE. IRC/ESE  has consequences  for preferences-reference
preferences  can be chosen  freely, but Vr and A together determine V. As long as reference preferences do
not satisfy the log-linear form
(63)  Vr(p,  y) = y(p)ln(y)  +  P(p)
or any  increasing transform,  A can be identified  from behavior alone (theorems  6.1 and  6.2, Blackorby
and Donaldson  1989).  If  V is  required to be globally  regular,  then  reference preferences  need  only be
nonhomothetic.
Phipps has estimated equivalence  scales for Canada  from demand behavior.  She  specified  a translog
functional  form for reference  preferences  and a Cobb-Douglas form for A (necessarily homogeneous  of
degree  zero) and estimated both  Vr and A. 15
Because the utility of each  member of household h is
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Table 1.  Summary of Aggregation  Results




sating  Money  Money  Welfare
Variations)  Metrics  Metrics  Ratios
Consistent social  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
preferences  in
PDi/ZDI
Consistent social  Only in  Yes  Yes  Yes
preferences in  special
PD,,/ZD,,  cases
Inequality aversion  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
possible with con-
sistency
Concave representa-  N.A.  Only in  Only in  Concave
tion of preferences  special  special  but not
cases  cases  exact
Ordering indepen-  N.A.  Only in  Only in  N.A.
dent of reference  special  special
prices and quanti-  cases  cases
ties
(64) Uh  =  V(pyh,  Yah)  =  V  h,  ah))
social evaluations can be made using equation (45).
In general, the social ordering is not independent of the representation of  reference preferences chosen-
increasing transforms of V rwill normally change the social orderings if W is unchanged.  That means that
some way to normalize  Vr must be found. This has, however, been done-by Phipps in the commodity-
independent  case, and by Jorgenson  and Slesnick (1984,  1987) in the commodity-specific  case.
This methodology  has many advantages  over the aggregation  of money measures of well-being:  there
are no reference prices to affect the social ordering;  the utilities in equation (64) (and, therefore, the social
ordering)  are  unaffected  by  the choice  of a reference  household;  there  are  no problems of concavity as
long as the utility function  U is concave in x for all a; inequality aversion is easily incorporated into social
evaluations; and household-specific  prices are easily handled.
16 The only restriction necessary is that IRC,
and its consequences  for preferences  [equation (61)],  must be assumed as a maintained hypothesis.
The model  can be  extended  to cover  unpriced  goods  (z);  z must,  in the general  case,  appear  in the
reference utility function  Vrand in the equivalence scale A. It is possible, however, for A to be independent
of z, and that restriction might make implementation easier.
Conclusion
Table 1 summarizes the main results for money measures of well-being. Although any practical procedure
for social  evaluation is necessarily theoretically  imperfect,  several judgments can be made. Social  eval-
uations based on aggregates  of household  willingness to  pay (compensating  and equivalent variations)
are,  from a theoretical standpoint, the least satisfactory of all the methods discussed above. Because the
social  binary  relations  lack  ordinary  rationality properties  (asymmetric  preference,  for example),  and
because these tests  are not efficiency  tests (even  in first-best environments),  it is difficult to claim  that
applied welfare economics  of this sort is a sensible  exercise. This is true even if income effects  are small
and  social preference  reversals  or intransitivities  rarely occur.  What the theoretical  results show is that
there is no consistent ranking of alternative  states of affairs based on these statistics.  It follows, therefore,
that  all particular rankings  are  meaningless.  They cannot  be regarded as  approximating  an underlying
ordering because there is nothing to approximate.  Further, because these procedures cannot accommodate
inequality aversion in a sensible way,  the case against them is strengthened.
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There  are problems of nonconcavity  and  sensitivity to reference  prices to be  sure,  but economic  states
are  always ordered,  and ethical  flexibility  is possible.  Investigators  should be aware,  however,  that the
choice  of referene prices may have nontrivial ethical  consequences.  Welfare ratios and their  aggregates
avoid  the  problems  of money  metrics  by  approximating  preferences  as homothetic.  This may  be an
acceptable price to pay, especially if data and economic projections  are less than perfect.
A good case can be made for the view that aggregating utilities is, when possible, better than aggregating
money  measures  of well-being.  However,  as the  section  on  equivalence  scales makes  clear,  practical
procedures  demand models that make somewhat unrealistic  abstractions from the real world.
The best way to test the usefulness of different social-evaluation  methods is, then, in the laboratory  of
real-world applications of welfare economics. Because the prevailing standard methodology is so defective
from a theoretical point of view, other methods or combinations  of methods deserve the serious attention
of practitioners.
[Received June 1990; final revision received November 1991.]
Notes
'Suppose  two households  face common prices that  a project  changes  from p  = (10,  10)  to p  = (5, 20) leaving
incomes unchanged at (20, 20). If preferences  are represented by V'(p, y,)= y,/p, and  V2(,  Y2)  = Y 2/p 2, compensating
variations are c, = 10 and  2 = -20, so BPA. Suppose V
2is replaced with  V2, where  V2(,  Y 2) =  2/(p  +  P2). Household
2  is still made  worse  off by the  change,  but now c  =-5, changing  the  sum to  +5  and  social preference  to APB.
Independence requires the ordering of any pair of alternatives to be  the same for all preference profiles in which the
individual orderings of the pair are the same.
2 The term "ordering"  is used to indicate a binary no-worse-than  relation that is reflexive,  complete, and transitive.
3 Consider two households in  a one-good  economy.  Each household's indirect  utility function  is  V(p,  y) =  y/p.  If
household  l's price and income moves from (5, 5) to (20, 40), its compensating variation is c,  = 20 with c, = -5  for
the reverse move.  If household  2 moves from  (20, 40) to (10,  10),  its compensating  variations are c 2 = -10 with  c2
= 20  for the reverse move, yielding c,  + c  = 10  and cl  + c2  =  15,  a preference  reversal.
4The test based on the sum of equivalent variations  has a different relationship  to the compensation test but, again,
the two are not equivalent (Blackorby and Donaldson  1990). The compensation test for a potential Pareto improvement
ranks social states with a counterfactual-compensation  that could be paid but is not. If compensation is paid,  there
is, of course,  no problem.
5The  Paretian  value judgment  is just  the ordinary  Pareto  principle,  which  makes  social  changes  to  which  each
household is indifferent a matter of social indifference, and changes which at least one household prefers and all weakly
prefer socially preferred.  This is the common element in the set of all Pareto-inclusive  social welfare functions.
6 This result follows from  a trivial generalization  of theorems  1 and 2 in Blackorby  and Donaldson  (1985).
7 See Weymark for a theoretical discussion.  Both McKenzie  and Samuelson introduced money metric utilities,  and
their use in applied welfare economics has been advocated by Diewert (1983)  and King,  among others.
8 The household's utility function may be defined by maximizing  a "social welfare function"  of its members'  utilities
with lump-sum  transfers of goods  and services. An aggregate consumer is not needed.
9 Suppose  V(p, y.) = Yl/p,,  V2(p, Y 2) = Y2/P 2, incomes  are  10 for each household, pr  =  (1, 3) for both, and a project
changes common prices  from pb =  (10,  10)  to pa =  (5, 20). The money metrics are  1 and 3 for B,  and 2 and 3/2  for
A. Using equation (19),  BPA. If V
2 is changed to V2(p,  y2) = y(,  + P2), 2 still prefers B to A, but 2's money metrics
are now 2 for B and 8/5 for A,  so the  sums become  3 for B and  18/5 for A,  reversing social preference to APB.
10  Quasihomothetic preferences  are not globally regular.  For global regularity,  preferences must be  homothetic.
B"  It is assumed that a solution to this equation always  exists.
12 Buccola discusses this question.
13 See Blackorby  and Donaldson (1987);  Lampman;  Morgan,  Meyers,  and Baldwin; Watts; and Wolfson.
14 See Barten;  Blackorby  and  Donaldson  (1989,  1991);  Blundell and  Lewbel;  Browning;  Deaton  and Muellbauer;
Fisher;  Grunau;  Jorgenson  and  Slesnick  (1984,  1987);  Lewbel  (1985,  1988a,  b);  Muellbauer  (1974,  1977);  Nelson;
Pollak and Wales (1979,  1981); and Ray.
15 Phipps' estimates are reasonable:  they lie in the right ranges and are sensitive to prices in the expected way.
16 The version of independence  of irrelevant  alternatives that allows for interpersonal  comparisons  is satisfied:  the
ranking of any two states depends only on utilities in those states.
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Appendix
This appendix provides proofs of several results about the aggregation of money metrics. Utility functions are assumed
to be continuous in x or in (p, y) and the function G in equation (18) is assumed to be continuous and increasing. Only
the private-goods  case  is considered,  and results are  proved both  for the domain  of household-specific  prices  (PDi)
and  for the  domain in  which prices are the  same for  all households  (PDIi).  For the aggregation  of ordinary  money
metrics, 7r  and 7rr are assumed  to belong to the same price domain,  and all incomes are positive.
Theorem 1
The ordering R, given by equation (18),  is independent of 7rr for all 7rr E  PD, (resp. PDII): (a) if and only if R is consistent
with a Pareto-inclusive  (increasing) continuous  social welfare function  WD, with
(Al)  ARB  I  W,(u  ...  u)  2  WD(u ....  uH);
and (b) if and only if WD and individual preferences  provide a price-independent  welfare prescription  (Roberts), with
(A2)  WD(V(P', Yl),  ... V(,  P  Y)) =  W(,r, G(yO,  ... ,  y  )),
with W, increasing  in its second argument for all  r E  PDI (PD ,,) and G homothetic.
Proof (a) Equation (18)  may be rewritten  as
(A3)  ARB  - G(E'(ul,  pr) ... EH(u,  pHr))  G(E (ub, pr) ....  EH(U  pHr)).
If R is independent of  rr,  .r
r may be set arbitrarily,  say to ((1,  ... ,  1),  .. , (1,  ... ,  1)) =  (1l,  ... ,  1m),  so that
(A4)  ARB  - WD(u, ... ,  uW)  >  WD(u  ....  UH),
where
(A5)  W(ul, .. U)  := G(E'(u l,  ... EH(UH,  lm))
Increasingness  and continuity  of W follow from the properties  of G and (E
l,  ... , EH).  Satisfaction of equation  (Al)
is clearly sufficient for independence of R from  rr.
(b) Now let ir = 7r
a = 7r
b.If R is independent of 7rr,  r may be  set equal to ir  (on either domain).  This makes Mi(ph,
Yh,  phr)  =  h, and equation (18) becomes
(A6)  (7r, y  ... , YR)R(r, y,  ... , yH) - G(y?,....  yH)  2  G(y...  y)
which means  that y is strictly separable  from ir  in W(N(p
1,  i), ... ,  IV(pH,  YH))  (r  E  PD, or PD,,), and equation (A2)
results.  Roberts showed that, because of homogeneity of degree  zero of each  Vh in (p, y), G must be homothetic.
Sufficiency can be shown as follows. Suppose equation (A2) is satisfied. Then
(A7)  WD(u) =  WD(U  ... , U)  =  WD(VI(p,  Yi),...,  V(pH,  YH))
= W,(r, G(E'(u1 ,  '), ...  , EH(u,  pH))),
for all 7r E  PDI (PDI,). Equation (A3) implies that
(A8)  ARB - G(E
l(u
a ,  plr)...  EH(u,  pHr))  G(E'(ub, pr),...  , EH(uU,  pHr))
W-(1r ' G(E
I(ua, pr),  ..  , EH(UH, pHr))  (,  G(E (u
r ,  plr),...  ,  E(ub,  pHr))
WD(U?  ..  . .,  )  > WD(u,  . . U),
which makes R independent of 7rr.
In theorems  2  and 3, the aggregation  of extended money metrics is considered.  There are two domains  for actual
prices,  PD, and PD,,  but reference  prices are  restricted to PDi. This is reasonable because  extended money metrics
are measured in dollars needed by the reference  single adult.
Theorem 2
R, defined by
(A9)  ARB  - G(Mi,(pl,  ya,  ao, pr  a
r)
...  , M(pHa,  ya,  a,  pr  a'))
>  G(Mkt(p
lb, yb,  al, pr  ar), ...  Ml(pHb, y  , aH, pr,  ar)),
is independent of  pr for all ar in PDi (PDI) if and only if R is consistent with a continuous, Pareto-inclusive  (increasing)
social welfare function  W [equation (Al)].
The proof of theorem  2 is identical to the proof of theorem  l(a), and is omitted.
If G, the aggregator function for extended money metrics, is symmetric and additively separable, then necessary and
sufficient conditions for R to be independent of pr are given by theorem  3.
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Theorem 3
If there  is one  person in each household,  the ordering R, given by
(A10)  ARmB  . Z  9(Mdi(pha, ya, p
r Ora))  2  Z  1k(Mi(phb,  yb, pr, ar)),
h  h
with 0 continuous and increasing, is independent ofpr on price domains PD, and PD1 I  if  and only if  reference preferences are
(All)  V(p,  y,  ar) = "y(p)y7  + /(p),
where a # O, or
(A12)  V(p,  y, a
r) =  7(p)ln(y) + f(p),
or any increasing transform.  When equation (Al 1) is satisfied,  O  is
(A13)  4(t) = at- + b,
(a > 0 for a > 0, a <  0 for a <0), and when equation (A12) is satisfied, ¢ is
(A14)  0(t) = a ln(t) + b.
Proof Equation (A10) implies that
(A15)  ARB  - Z  (Er(u^,  pr)) >  Z  O(Er(ub, pr)),
where  Er(u, p) := E(u, p, ar). If R is independent of pr  pr can be chosen  arbitrarily to get
(A16)  ARB  - (  p(ua)  _ S  4f(u^),
with 1 increasing and continuous.  It follows that
(A17)  1  ((Er(U
h ,  pr)) =  F(Z  O(Uh), pr),
where  F  is continuous  and increasing  in  its first argument.  Defining  h :=  1(uh) and f(zh,  pr)  = ((Er(k-(Zh),  pr) =
(g(Er(uh,  pr)), equation (A17) can be written  as
(A18)  F(2  Zh, pr) =  Z  f(Zh, pr).
For each pr  this is a Pexider equation  (Eichhom) whose solution is
(A19)  f(zh,  pr) = 7(pr)zh +  f(pr)
It follows that
(A20)  Er(u, p) =  -k 1(l(p)y(u)  + 3(p)),
and
(A21)  V(p, y) = 1-'(r(P)k(Y) +  3(p)),
where  y(p) :=  l/a(p)  and ((p)  := -3(p)/((p).  Vr must be  homogeneous  of degree zero in (p,  y) and that requires, for
all X >  0,
(A22)  y(Xp)y(Xy)  + ((Xp)  =  Y(p)¢(y)  + P(p),
or
(A23)  f (Xy)  =  (p) 1y) + -P)=  7(X, p)1(y) + f(X, p).
1k(Xp)  y(X, p)
For each p, this is a functional equation whose solution is (Eichhom, theorem 2.7.3, p.  42) equations (A13) or (A14),
which, using equation  (A21), imply equations (Al 1) and (A12).  Sufficiency is easily shown.
It makes little ethical sense to allow G to be nonsymmetric. Theorem 3, however, can be extended to this case, with
the same symmetric  result.  Theorem  3 can easily  be  specialized to the case  where  G is the  simple sum of extended
money metrics. In that case, reference  preferences  must be
(A24)  V(p,  y,  ar) =  y(p)y  + (3(p)
or any increasing  transform.
If the price domain  for  rr is extended  to PD,,  then ~(phr) in equation  (A19) must be independent of h, and  so y in
equation (All) cannot depend on p. This leaves  only equation (A12) which  requires a Cobb-Douglas  G.  If G is the
simple sum, an impossibility results.
If,  in the case  that all households  contain one member,  R is required to be  independent of the choice  of ar, then
each household's preferences must satisfy equation (Al 1) or equation (A12), but preferences  may differ  among house-
holds.
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